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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Rrspondent, 
vs. 
LLOYD WILLIAM NORMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15315 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks a reversal of a judgment entered in 
the Second Judicial District Court, in and for the County of 
Davis, State of Utah, finding him guilty of the offense of 
attempted manslaughter. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was originally charged with the offense of 
attempted criminal homicide in violation of UCA 76-5-203(b), a 
felony of the second degree. A trial was held in the lower 
Court without a jury. After all the evidence had been pre-
sented, the Court found appellant guilty of attempteu man-
s l~u4hter. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
RELIEF SOllCHT ON l\PPEAL 
Appellant submits that attempted manslaughter is 
not a criminal offense under Utah Law, and, therefore, regu 
an order reversing the lower Court's iudgment and an order 
releasing appellant from custody. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the early morning hours of December 25, 19Jf 
Clifford Daniels, and others, were at appellant's home cele-
brating Christmas {T-211, 212). Appellant and Mr. Daniels 
had played cards during the preceding evening and all had 
been drinking {T-212). 
An argument developed between appellant and Mr. 
Daniels (T-214, 215), during which, Mr. Daniels, while hold!r 
an open knife rriinting toward appellant, sa i 'l he could whi~ 
appellant {T-216) • Appellant thereupon left the room, went 
into his bedroom where he obtained a forty-five caliber pis•c 
which was loaded, placed the same under his belt bEhind h~ 
and returned to the •Jame table where he sat opposite Mr. 
Duniels (T-219). 
Appellant, without Mr. Daniels' knowledge, removec' 
the pistol from his belt, cocked the same and laid it on his 
lap underneath the table {T-220). He then demanded the knife 
{T-220). Mr. Daniels shoved it toward appellant, who pickEG 
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it up and threw it against the wall (T-220). Appellant then 
reached underneath the table for the gun to uncock the hammer. 
His fingers slipped, the gun discharged and rtr. Daniels was 
struck in the abdomen (T-221). 




ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL MANSLAUGHTER IS NOT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court found 
appellant guilty of attempted manslaughter, a felony of the 
third degree (R-20; T-258). 
on0 acts: 
Under Utah Law: 
"(l) Criminal Homicide constitutes man-
slaughter if the actor 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of 
another, or 
(b) Causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, for which there is a reasonable ex-
planation or excuse ••. " UCA 76-5-204(1) (a) 
and (b) 
"recklessly ... with respect to circum-
stances surrounding his conduct or the result 
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of his conduct when he is aware of but con-
scientiously disroqarcls a s11bstantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstancrs 
exist or the result will occur . 
UCA 76-2-103(3) 
There is no definition of "Under the influenc12 of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance" in the Utah Criminal Coce, 
The Court did not specify whether its finding of 
"guilty of attempted manslauqhter" was promised upon subpar 
(a) or (b) of the manslaughter statute quote'' ,:ibove. 
In any event, appellant claims that there is no 
criminal offense under Utah Law known as attempted manslauc-
The elements of attempt are: 
"(1) For purposes of this part a person 
is guilty of an attemp to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind ol culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense." UCA 
76-4-101(1) 
The term "culpability" as used in the attemµt statute, mea'' 
the appropriate mens rea associated with the offense the ac: 
is charged with having attempted. It does not mean one's 
actions which may be deemed "reckless" or which may be the 
result of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance". Othe~, 
the second element of attempt, . engaged in conduct cc· 
tuting a substantial step toward commission of the offense", 
becomes meaningless and, thus, unnecessary. 
This analysis is consister,t with the general rulr 
law associated with the offense nf criminal ,1t_t0mpt · 
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"To convict one of an attemrt to commit 
a crime, it is necessary that the overt act 
have been done with the actual intent to commit 
that particular crime. Such intent must be an 
intent in fact asdlslinguished from an intent 
in law, and cannot be implied as a matter of 
law from the existence of the same facts and 
circumstances which would, in case the deed had 
been accomplished, have furnished conclusive 
evidence of an intention to commit the substan-
tive crime. 11 22 C.J.S. 75 (3), page 233. 
(Emphasis added) 
See also State of Washington vs. Lewis, 
69 Wash. 2d 120, 417 P.2d 618 (1966) 
Since the term "culpability" refers to the necessary 
associated with the offense attempted, it must be 
decided what men~ rea is applicable to the manslaughter statute 
in Utah. A reading of the statute clearly reveals that there 
is no mens ~requirement; rather, one's conduct, if done 
"recklessly" or as a result of "extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance" constitutes the offense of manslaughter and no 
mental intent is required. As a matter of fact, if one acts 
"recklessly" with intent to kill, then the offense would be 
"criminal homicide" and not manslaughter. UCA 76-5-202 and 
203 (1977 Supp.). Since there is no mens rea with manslaughter, 
there car1 be no offense of attempted manslaughter. 
In State vs. Smith, 534 P.2d 1180 (Ore. 1975), the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon specifically held that there is no 
offense of "attempted reckless murder". 
"We conclude that the legislative scheme, 
as a whole, is complete and consistent with 
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the approach that 'one c~r:not_~ttempt to_ci__c:! 
recklessly' 
"It ther0fcre was error to instruct the 
jury onti1e- th-eori_Si(-;:,-1 1_en1E._ted reckless __:_ 
murder, " 534 i'.2cl at 1184 (EmPllasis 
added) 
Since defendant was convicted oi a nonexistent 
criminal offense, his conviction should be reversed and ~e 
should be released from custody forthwith. 
POINT 11 
DEFENDANT CAtlNOT BE RETI{ rno llN 'f'IIE ORH;JNAL CHJl.RGE 
provides: 
Section 12, Article l of the Constit 11tion of UtJh 
.Nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense." 
The issue is whether or not a finding of guilty br 
the trier of fact of a lesser included offense is an acquitt 
of the greater offense. The Supreme Court of Kansas in the 
case of State vs, McCorgary, '543 P.2d 952(Kan.1975) holds in 
the affirmative: 
"We further note that appellant was 
charged with first degree murder and con-
vict~d of the lc:ger offense of second 
degree murder. As to those two offenses 
a conviction of the lesser offense is an 
acquittal n~ __ :!_=he __ g__r::Pater--degree o( __ the 





State vs. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 
8TJT19'Ts l ·;state vs. Pia, 514 
(Hawaii l975f;sta.t-e v. Leverich, 
45, 522 r. 2d u9o(l973Y-. ---
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Under the holding of the McCorgary case cited above, 
aJJpellant, in the instant case, was acquitted of the greater 
offense of attempted criminal homicide when the Court found him 
guilty of what the Court thought was the lesser included offense 
of attempted manslaughter. This is true even though the convic-
tion on the lesser included offense may be reversed on appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court in Green vs. U.S., 78 S.Ct. 221, 
355 U.S. 184, 2 L.Ed 2d 199 (1957) held: 
"At Green's first trial the jury was 
authorized to find him •1uilty of either 
first degree murder ... or, alternatively, 
of second degree murder .... The jury 
found him guilty of second degree murder, 
but on his appeal that conviction was re-
versed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
At this new trial Green was tried again, not 
for second degree murder, but for first 
degree murder, even though the jury had 
refused to find him guilty on that charge 
and it was in no way involved in his appeal. 
For the reasons stated hereafter, we conclude 
that this second trial for first degree 
murder placed Green in jeopardy twice for 
the same offense in violation of the consti-
tution." 355 U.S. at 190, 75 s.ct. at 225, 
2 L.Ed 2d at 205 and 206 (Emphasis added) 
See also Bunnell vs. Superior Court of Santa Clara 
County, 119 Cal. Rptr 302, 531 P. 2d 1086 (1975) 
Since attempted manslaughter is not a criminal offense, 
~ for.tor~ it. cannot be a lesser included offense of attempted 
criminal homicide. The Court should therefore have found the 
cle fcnclant guilty of attempted criminal homicide as charged or 
not quilty. Since the Court implicitly found appellant not 
q11i ltv of the oriqinal charge by finding him guilty of a 
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leased from custody and the conviction reversec'. , 
- -
1 <I eoµard,· 
has attached to the 01iqinal charge and, thus, the Stutc: hJ 
no legal right, nor n:-.cison, for holding appellant longer, 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT HOLDS THl\'l' l\TTJ\r'WT'ED MANSLAlJl;HTEk IS 
A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED CRU1INAL 
HOMICIDE, DEFF:NDANT TS STILL EN'I'ITLl-:0 TO !\ 
REVERSAL AND f., PELEASF IN THAT THE E\'TDC:NCE T'''' 1 
DUCED AT TRIAL WA:~ INSUJCTICTENT TO SUSTAIN TflE 
CONVICTION. 
Mr. Clifford Daniels, the victim, was '~cllled to 
testify for the Respondant. His testimony described the 
incident as follows: That appellant, after the children l• 
his home, suddenly accused Mr. Daniels of messing with a No 
(T-31); that appellant hit his hands together, knocking 
glasses off the table where appellant and Mr. Norman were 
seated, facing one another (T-31) ; that Mr. Daniel.s got U? · 
leave appellant's home (T-31); that appellant got out of hr 
chair, reached behind his back, obtained a forty-five caL 
pistol and shot Mr. Daniels in the abdomen (T-32); that be 
thereafter threatened to kill Mr. Daniels and ordewd hi 11 
out of the house (T-32). 
Appellant, on the other hand, described the incic 
stating that Mr. Daniels harl a knife with the blade npen ar. 
said that he could whip arp('llant tT-214, 215); dc>fenCtnn' 
up from the table a:: wl1i1~]1 IJoth wcr-e seated ancl went 11 '' 
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bedroom to get his gun (T-216, 217, 219); appellant placed the 
gun under his belt behind his back and returned to the table 
and sat dow11 (T-219); appellant pulled the gun from under his 
belt behind his back and placed it in front of him on his lap 
underneath the table (T-219, 220); appellant then asked Mr. 
Daniels for the knife whereupon Mr. Daniels provided him with 
the same and appellant picked it up and threw it against the 
wall (T-220); appellant then attempted to uncock the gun while 
it was still under the table, at which time, his finger slipped, 
the gun fired and the bullet struck Mr. Daniels in the abdomen 
(T-220, 221, 222). 
The trial Court apparently disbelieved Mr. Daniels' 
version of the facts in that it did not find appellant guilty 
of attempted criminal homicide. The Court must have, there-
fore, given more weight to appellant's version of the incident. 
Appellant's version is corroberated by Ted Bird who 
testified in his behalf. Mr. Bird stated that he test fired 
the gun in question the day before trial and as he lowered the 
hammer to uncock the gun, it slipped from his fingers (T-255, 
256). This experience is identical to the accidental firing of 
the gun as described by appellant when Mr. Daniels was shot, 
thus yivi11g credibility to appellant's version of the facts. 
Moreover, Officer Benjamin R. Rendon, Police Detective 
<>I ,·1, ntield City Police Dei:;artment, testified that a mark on 
: I:. ' 1 l l of appellant's residence was thought to be made by the 
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bullet fired from appcl] ant's ""' and that: the mark "''l" 
twenty-three and one-half inc:ht.'S rrnn1 the floor (T-147, l~r, 
Notwithstanding, Mr. Daniels tcsti_fi0d he ,,,cJ:; shot in the 
abdomen approximately six inches above his nuvc l .~nr1 e:,it•cc' 
back approximately four inches above his IJelt (T-188, 189), 
It becomes apparent that the murk on the wall allegerJly m.ide 
by the bullet would be much high• t11an the distance measure 
by Officer Rendon hacl Mr. Daniels been shot while standing, 
Thus, the physical e'1idence '.;ll[>ports appellant's version tha· 
the gun fired while he had it unclt~r the table on his lap anc 
Mr. Daniels was seated on the other side. 
These facts corroberate appellant's tesLimony th"t 
the firing was accidental. Since the Court apparently did c 
believe Mr. Daniels' testimony dS to how the shooting occurr 
it should have found appellant not guilty in that there were 
other facts before the Court negating appellant's claim that 
firing was accidental. 
As a consequence, appellant is entitled to au~~ 
and immediate release from the custody of the State of Ut.ir. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant alleges that his conviction of attem~~ 
manslaughter is legally fatal in that, under Utah Law, lhert 
is no crime of attempted manslauqhter. Further, the fact 
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l11ill t lie Court found defendant guilty of what the Court thought 
was a lesspr included offense, results in appellant being found 
nut guilty of the original charge. As a result, appellant can-
11ot now be tried a second time on the original charge in that 
it would violate his constitutional right against being placed 
in j~opardy twice for the same offense. 
In the event the Cour1 finds there is a crime under 
Utah Law of attempted manslaughter, appellant contends that 
there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to support 
conviction of the lesser offense. 
Respectfully submitted, 
O_i\ WIN ANS N 
Attorney for Appellant 
845 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utan 84010 
Telephone: 295-2391 
CERTIFICAT~ OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Bri~[ cf Appellant to ROBERT 3. HANSEN, Attorney General, 
Stal:c c C!pitol 
prepilicl, this 
Bui~~· Salt 
/ '.:( day of 
,~ {· 
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